As with the last post, I am submitting something I wrote back in the day. I'm not sure when I wrote this, but I like it. It's a song, about a girl, and hopefully someday I will be able to put some music to it.
I worked hard to fit my face to your clay
Clay worked hard to be all it could for you
You worked hard to cover your eyes with a lamp shade
But, I could see your mind’s reflections all over my walls
Walls worked hard to tell me the truth
Truth worked hard to dim in the fade
Fade worked hard to consume my vision
Vision is all we have
Let my vision be free
Vision is what I have
Let it be me
Time worked hard to restore lost pieces of me
Time and I, we fight until we bleed
Blood splattered arms never can comfort you
But, I could see you were feeling the withdrawal too
Our clay cracked and shattered our hopes, and our dreams
But our dreams worked hard to keep the past alive
Life worked hard to be my faded vision
Walls worked hard to tell me the truth
Truth worked hard to dim in the fade
Fade worked hard to consume my vision
Vision is all we have
Let my vision be free
Vision is what I have
Let it be me
Monday, December 25, 2006
A Carnival Darkly
Here is a paragraph from my first attempt at a novel. I failed to finish more than a chapter, but after finding and reading what i wrote I realized that at least some of it was pretty cool. Observe:
Before entering in the Alameda County Fair one must understand the word "gloaming." Gloaming’s are an overwhelming feeling of dread that something horrible is about to happen. They can be felt in horror movies before all the action and violence occur. Its not exactly foreshadowing, but the prickles on your screaming dates shoulder because of the eerie music-that’s a gloaming. So how do you incorporate the feeling of impeccable doom with the fun of a Ferris wheel and cotton candy? Take one step inside and close your eyes. Now take a deep breath and smell the air. Your next move will be a cough, and if you have allergies something worse. It’s not the pollen that got you. It’s the smell that you’re about to be had. It’s the dirt, cow shit and the germs of a fifty-year-old walking dead carne being forced into your lungs. Its not that it smells bad; most can’t put a finger on why it’s different. But, there is no doubt your subconscious will know. Now it’s only a matter of time before you shiver.
Before entering in the Alameda County Fair one must understand the word "gloaming." Gloaming’s are an overwhelming feeling of dread that something horrible is about to happen. They can be felt in horror movies before all the action and violence occur. Its not exactly foreshadowing, but the prickles on your screaming dates shoulder because of the eerie music-that’s a gloaming. So how do you incorporate the feeling of impeccable doom with the fun of a Ferris wheel and cotton candy? Take one step inside and close your eyes. Now take a deep breath and smell the air. Your next move will be a cough, and if you have allergies something worse. It’s not the pollen that got you. It’s the smell that you’re about to be had. It’s the dirt, cow shit and the germs of a fifty-year-old walking dead carne being forced into your lungs. Its not that it smells bad; most can’t put a finger on why it’s different. But, there is no doubt your subconscious will know. Now it’s only a matter of time before you shiver.
Thursday, December 21, 2006
Dental Illusion
fireplace chat:
I have found writing a drag in my home town... sexually. And i am serious when i say sexually, since certain adventures this week should be labeled as mishaps. Things have been interesting, i reconnected with 2 x girlfriends in a span of 2 days, and this is amazing since i don't have many. Both nights were good, i got more than a friend should. The first being play, the second being information. Information i really don't feel right about at this present moment. But it doesn't matter, because i think i made some amends with both girls. So, i may feel fuzzy, but atleast things arn't totally distorted... sexually!
Today i went to the dentist office after making an apointment. Yesterday they even called me and reminded me, yet the receptionist had no record of the apointment or that they called me. I felt like i walked right into a curb your enthusiam moment. The lady even said "well im sorry sir, were closing soon and all these other people have waited" i chimmed back with "my lack of waiting has nothing to do with your screw up" but i wasn't angry, i was happy i could postpone sitting in the chair of doom probably contemplating the night before (see above). So i went home and jammed, jamming was the perfect remedy for the fuzz i was feeling. I love music, and i love playing music with others more than women. So playings music helps me see the bigger picture... a.k.a. bitches aint shit but hoes and tricks.
I have found writing a drag in my home town... sexually. And i am serious when i say sexually, since certain adventures this week should be labeled as mishaps. Things have been interesting, i reconnected with 2 x girlfriends in a span of 2 days, and this is amazing since i don't have many. Both nights were good, i got more than a friend should. The first being play, the second being information. Information i really don't feel right about at this present moment. But it doesn't matter, because i think i made some amends with both girls. So, i may feel fuzzy, but atleast things arn't totally distorted... sexually!
Today i went to the dentist office after making an apointment. Yesterday they even called me and reminded me, yet the receptionist had no record of the apointment or that they called me. I felt like i walked right into a curb your enthusiam moment. The lady even said "well im sorry sir, were closing soon and all these other people have waited" i chimmed back with "my lack of waiting has nothing to do with your screw up" but i wasn't angry, i was happy i could postpone sitting in the chair of doom probably contemplating the night before (see above). So i went home and jammed, jamming was the perfect remedy for the fuzz i was feeling. I love music, and i love playing music with others more than women. So playings music helps me see the bigger picture... a.k.a. bitches aint shit but hoes and tricks.
Friday, December 15, 2006
I think I may have learned something important
This semester has yet again been as much of a learning experience as the day I found out there is a difference between "our" and "are." I can't articulate all I have learned, because much of it is felt. I carry myself differently, I perceive things differently, I drink a lot of Arizona ice tea (probably more than any sane individual does). My roommate Tyler is in a sense somebody who I would rather be at times. He's a free spirit that does what he wants whenever he wants and doesn’t over think the situation at hand. I think way too much, probably why I eat so much green food. But, good has come out of it, I’m slowly learning to go with the flow much easier than I use too, thinking a lot less. However, this also cuts into my creative process, but compromise is good especially if it means I am happier even if I have less to produce.
I am probably going to get 2 D’s this semester. I have never gotten less than a B+ on any philosophy class, so I am a little ashamed. The quality of my work is important, especially since all these philosophy teachers know me as one of the better students. This new work I have done is inconsistent with the old work, my integrity diminished. Therefore, right now I am making the claim (hopefully I will hold to it) that my last semester at Chico is going to be one in which I focus my energy into my work, and not get lost some where between parties, pot and work.
Being single has had its ups and downs. I started going out seriously the day I got to college, and it wasn't until my senior year before I had any freedom to act as I wished. Problem is I didn't even know how to act or what I should act on. So, this semester has been a learning process. This hot neighbor of mine always comes by offering sex for green food, I still haven’t excepted since I would feel used and that I had been involved in some Rastafarian prostitution scheme. And who is to say she shouldn’t pay me in green??? There have been other propositions I have turned down, including velma from couch bandits and this ugly girl at work. Maybe I am just still scarred to even get close to a women, because my one and only turned my insides into an old man at a bar on drink number 12. But I am still cool, I am still collected, and I am defiantly ready to get plastered and not think twice about it.
So, what’s next for me. I can only hope that whatever I learn is covered in salt, but lends a sweet aftertaste. The last semester has been salty, it has been sweet, I have made enough money to have fun for 5 weeks, and I plan on seeing all my desires through to practical application.
I am probably going to get 2 D’s this semester. I have never gotten less than a B+ on any philosophy class, so I am a little ashamed. The quality of my work is important, especially since all these philosophy teachers know me as one of the better students. This new work I have done is inconsistent with the old work, my integrity diminished. Therefore, right now I am making the claim (hopefully I will hold to it) that my last semester at Chico is going to be one in which I focus my energy into my work, and not get lost some where between parties, pot and work.
Being single has had its ups and downs. I started going out seriously the day I got to college, and it wasn't until my senior year before I had any freedom to act as I wished. Problem is I didn't even know how to act or what I should act on. So, this semester has been a learning process. This hot neighbor of mine always comes by offering sex for green food, I still haven’t excepted since I would feel used and that I had been involved in some Rastafarian prostitution scheme. And who is to say she shouldn’t pay me in green??? There have been other propositions I have turned down, including velma from couch bandits and this ugly girl at work. Maybe I am just still scarred to even get close to a women, because my one and only turned my insides into an old man at a bar on drink number 12. But I am still cool, I am still collected, and I am defiantly ready to get plastered and not think twice about it.
So, what’s next for me. I can only hope that whatever I learn is covered in salt, but lends a sweet aftertaste. The last semester has been salty, it has been sweet, I have made enough money to have fun for 5 weeks, and I plan on seeing all my desires through to practical application.
Tuesday, December 12, 2006
Break Bleak Eros of Identity
I am done fucking around, due to some factors outside my general desire to be lazy, i am going to live striclty under some maxims during the next five weeks, and if time permitting i want as many maxims to extend through my last chico semester.
1. Workout, in some way, everyday... playing basketball and racketball counts, drinking arizona ice tea whie chillaxin by the pool doesn't.
2. Write and Read eveyday. that's right kids, lots of stupid commentary and intelligent philosophical nonsense... god help us
3. Look for lots of small jobs, if not, lie about it and say you did
4. Remember, when going to a bar, you have a set of morals you want to abide by, but the next two weeks carries a significant qualifier, namely that of the absence of standards.
5. Keep up the absence of smoking, lungs are more important than your face
6. Love thyself harder than you have ever loved Greg parker.
That last one might be difficult, but i'm gonna try my damndest
1. Workout, in some way, everyday... playing basketball and racketball counts, drinking arizona ice tea whie chillaxin by the pool doesn't.
2. Write and Read eveyday. that's right kids, lots of stupid commentary and intelligent philosophical nonsense... god help us
3. Look for lots of small jobs, if not, lie about it and say you did
4. Remember, when going to a bar, you have a set of morals you want to abide by, but the next two weeks carries a significant qualifier, namely that of the absence of standards.
5. Keep up the absence of smoking, lungs are more important than your face
6. Love thyself harder than you have ever loved Greg parker.
That last one might be difficult, but i'm gonna try my damndest
Sunday, December 10, 2006
Williams - Fear Extending
my favorite contemporary philosopher - Bernard Williams is a G
here is my paper on his essay "the self and the future"
Fear Extending
I. Introduction
In his essay “The Self and the Future” Bernard Williams argues for the bodily criterion of personal identity from the claim that undergoing physical pain in the future is not excluded by any psychological state one experiences at the time. Ones fear of pain extends through any experiment thought to involve body exchanging. Since a person who has an entirely new body, but the same character as before, will still fear bodily harm, the bodily criterion seems the most plausible explanation of identity.
II. Background, Limitations and the Initial Case
As a thought experiment proposed to get closer to the core of the problem of personal identity, Williams explore bodily exchange and its implications. A process in which bodies were exchanged is question begging, because it presupposes that the bodies are actually exchanged as opposed to the mind exchanging or consciousness exchanging. Williams, firstly, wants to discuss such a case in terms of information extracted into a device from A’s and B’s brains and replaced in the others brain.
However, there are two certain limitations Williams’s wants to put aside in order to ignore certain extraneous objections. Firstly, there are limitations with regard to character and mannerisms. If two people, extremely different in personality, body and memory decided to exchange bodies, certain problems would arise concerning the plausibility of such personality and memory as connected with the new body. In the case of the two people being of different sex or if both people have a large age gap, each new person might find it extremely uncomfortable, and want to change back. “There might be grave difficulties in reading B’s dispositions in any possible performance of A’s body.” Williams writes that, for the sake of argument, in this thought experiment, each person is sufficiently like the other for such problems to not arise. He cannot state how alike they must be, but without such technology to make bodily exchange possible, we cannot presently know how alike they must be. Therefore, for this thought experiment, bodily exchange is possible in this strict sense.
The problem is, if both A and B are too alike, it may not be possible to describe the situation as a successful body exchange. We might not be able to tell that such information extracted (character etc) from A is now in the body of B. It is crucial to be absolutely sure that an exchange has taken place. Memory has a casual relationship with the body; it is a necessary condition that memories do not run outside the body. Therefore, there must be a casual link between the state of the body and of the new experiences placed in the body. If information was extracted from A’s and B’s brain, put onto a device while each brain was repaired to prepare for transfer, and then put into the others body, A and B would not have to have a total recall of memory. The memory would be there to begin with when A and B woke up from the state they were put in for the information extraction.
We can now clearly describe a situation where persons A and B enter a machine and exit as the A-body person and B-body person. The A-body person has the appearance of A (i.e. the body of A), but has the memories of B, and the B-body person has the body of B and the memories of A. The question to ask concerning personal identity is - what happened to person A? Where does the identity of A now reside? Person A is now either in the body of A, in the body of B, in both bodies or has ceased to exist.
The possibility of person A being in both the body of A and B can be immediately ruled out on the assumption that there cannot be two of the same person. In other words, this possibility would violate transitivity. The Lockean theory of identity would insist that person A is in the B-body person, because that is where A’s consciousness is. A’s memories will now extend inside the body of B. If A and B are told that after the procedure one of them will get money and the other will receive torture, the logical answer A should give is for the B-body person to get the money and the A-body person to get the torture. Thus showing that this procedure must really be about changing bodies, because each subject considers himself to be in a new body. To care about what happens to ones self does not entail (by this situation) that one cares about ones present body.
III. The Six Cases
Williams then changes direction in his discussion of personal identity to argue for the bodily criterion. He proposes six different situations all including the end result of torturing A. Furthermore, in each case, A is told what will happen to him leading up to torture. Williams claims that no psychological state (other than unconsciousness) can change A’s fear of the upcoming torture; however, an opponent would argue that yes some psychological state can. Because to say it cannot leave in question the very person for whom A is fearful. In other words, it presupposes A will be A after the operation. Here are the six cases (all followed by torture):
(i) Amnesia is produced in A
(ii) (i), character is changed
(iii) (ii), fictitious illusory memories beliefs are induced
(iv) (iii), illusory memories believes are induced, namely those of person B
(v) (iv), except from a real person B
(vi) (v), A’s memories are transferred to B
Williams then discusses the possible differences in reaction towards each individual case and concludes that there can be no difference in fearing future torture. No one would claim that (i), (ii) and (iii) would produce any difference in A’s prospect of future pain. Just because one has forgotten (amnesia) that he will be tortured does not change the fact that he will be tortured. In fact, for one to be tortured without any prior knowledge could make ones fear worse. Logically, (ii) and (iii) make no relevant difference in principle; these situations only seem to give more reason to fear as well. Situation (iv) introduces B, but makes no material difference concerning A. It is an external fact (external to A) that such transferred memory impressions have a model (B). If (iv) does not produces a difference in attitude towards fear, than (v) will not either, because all that is added in (v) is a model for the cause. An outside model should have no bearing on experience or not experiencing future pain. The pain itself will still occur, so the expectation of pain is still present. “If his fears can, as it were, reach through the change, it seems a mere trimming how the change is in fact induced.” Situation (v) is different from the initial situation because there is a concrete person B left; therefore, there is no question as to which one is person A.
Most people would agree that there is a difference in case (vi). The difference being A now has reason to feel differently regarding any future pain, because according to the Lockean theory of identity, person A is now in the body of B. The impressions and character that once was in A is now in B, so this situation looks like that of a bodily-exchange. However, in situation (vi) there actually is no difference in what happens to person A. The only difference is that person B now has the memories and impressions of person A. If amnesia, new impressions and a model for new impressions do not effect person A’s attitude towards pain, then the fact that another person now has person A’s old impressions should not effect A’s attitude either. Personhood is local and is not be affected by what happens to another.
IV. Fear and Indeterminacy
It is not the case that fear can never be hindered from a psychological state. If someone is afraid of spiders, and will be forced in the future to go into jungle that houses many different varieties of spiders, one could be given a pill that curbs his or her psychological state to the point that he or she does not even believe spiders exist. This would allow such a person to enter in the jungle. Furthermore, one might fear change, even though such change would make the resulting state pleasant (e.g. if one could be hooked up to an eternal pleasure machine, but fear this option as better than his prior existence).
Lock claims that the pain will extend through case (vi), because aversion to pain is “absolutely minimally dependent on character or belief.” Aversion to pain is much different from less psychologically straining pain (e.g. what one feels when one hits his funny bone), because all people have the ability to experience it. Certain people may actually enjoy pain (e.g. masochist), but no one, unless psychologically incapable (e.g. unconscious) can enjoy extreme pain. Extreme pains are precisely what is being discussed here. No matter how masochistic, torture is not to be enjoyed by anyone.
One obvious question to ask is - why does Williams set up this thought experiment without any indeterminacy regarding if A will get tortured or not? In a sense, it might be fairer to opponents of Williams’s theory to set up the case with five subjects. Giving A less than one hundred percent probability of being tortured. However, Williams believes that this can not be the case. To be told that the chance that I will be tortured is less than sure should not effect me, because a borderline case has no comprehensible representation in my expectations of torture and of my feelings that go with my expectations (Williams). In other words, the fact that something may or may not happen to me in the future has no effect on me if said thing actually happens. If I win the lottery, my reaction will always be that of joy no matter what happened to me between buying the ticket and when the numbers were called.
I may be more cheerful if I know I have a chance of escaping the torture, but I will still have fear. All the emotions I have revolve around and have the capability of being changed by the eventual determination of the indeterminacy. There are many indeterminate factors that surround many particular situation. In all of Williams’s cases, what is determinate is that the subject will feel fear.
V. Conclusions
One of the general aspects in certain analytic theories of personal identity is that the type of language one uses when writing out thought experiments concerning personal identity can slant the conclusion of the argument containing such experiments. It is sometimes assumed that a first-person description supports a mentalistic (Lockean) view of the self, and a third-person description a bodily conception. However, the reverse happens in Williams’s article. The initial case is in the third person and supports the Lockean view and the second set of cases is in the first person and supports the bodily criterion.
However, Williams concludes that the reason why the initial case supports the Lockean view is how the example is set up. If A got B’s memories, but B kept his memories we would be more hesitant to accept the Lockean view. We would say A is in the A-body person with new memories.
VI. One Objection
I thought up one objection towards William’s theory. It seems that Williams allows for other emotions to be effected by a change in psychological states. If A is afraid of spiders, he can be given the impression of one who has no fear towards spiders. In a situation where that person would be soon forced to enter into a spider infested area, the new memories and character he has should help curb his present distress. He also allows that aversion to pain has minimal cause from character. So it seems that it is at least plausible for a culture that produces people who feel pain only slightly, and are more indifferent to pain than effected by it. Years of evolution could produce humans who hardly can feel pain if certain mutations develop that help in survival that cause such a thing. It is even possible if just one person develops this indifference. If A trusts everything we tell him before the torture, and we tell him that we found the one person on earth who is indifferent to pain and his impressions would be put into A’s brain, his attitude should change. If either of these scenarios occur it is possible for the new character, memories and impressions to help change the fear of future pain for someone who would do whatever is in their power not to feel it. Therefore, pain would not extend through the body changing experience.
I think this argument is not forceful though, because such impressions may be so different that such impressions have no connection with the new body they inhabit. Also, the body must be an important part of a human that is indifferent to pain. And, if the impressions are to actually make a difference, the new psychology can be the only possible factor to change the way the pain is felt. Without the old body, extreme forms of pain should penetrate even the most indifferent impressions. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that even impressions from such a differently evolved human would help.
here is my paper on his essay "the self and the future"
Fear Extending
I. Introduction
In his essay “The Self and the Future” Bernard Williams argues for the bodily criterion of personal identity from the claim that undergoing physical pain in the future is not excluded by any psychological state one experiences at the time. Ones fear of pain extends through any experiment thought to involve body exchanging. Since a person who has an entirely new body, but the same character as before, will still fear bodily harm, the bodily criterion seems the most plausible explanation of identity.
II. Background, Limitations and the Initial Case
As a thought experiment proposed to get closer to the core of the problem of personal identity, Williams explore bodily exchange and its implications. A process in which bodies were exchanged is question begging, because it presupposes that the bodies are actually exchanged as opposed to the mind exchanging or consciousness exchanging. Williams, firstly, wants to discuss such a case in terms of information extracted into a device from A’s and B’s brains and replaced in the others brain.
However, there are two certain limitations Williams’s wants to put aside in order to ignore certain extraneous objections. Firstly, there are limitations with regard to character and mannerisms. If two people, extremely different in personality, body and memory decided to exchange bodies, certain problems would arise concerning the plausibility of such personality and memory as connected with the new body. In the case of the two people being of different sex or if both people have a large age gap, each new person might find it extremely uncomfortable, and want to change back. “There might be grave difficulties in reading B’s dispositions in any possible performance of A’s body.” Williams writes that, for the sake of argument, in this thought experiment, each person is sufficiently like the other for such problems to not arise. He cannot state how alike they must be, but without such technology to make bodily exchange possible, we cannot presently know how alike they must be. Therefore, for this thought experiment, bodily exchange is possible in this strict sense.
The problem is, if both A and B are too alike, it may not be possible to describe the situation as a successful body exchange. We might not be able to tell that such information extracted (character etc) from A is now in the body of B. It is crucial to be absolutely sure that an exchange has taken place. Memory has a casual relationship with the body; it is a necessary condition that memories do not run outside the body. Therefore, there must be a casual link between the state of the body and of the new experiences placed in the body. If information was extracted from A’s and B’s brain, put onto a device while each brain was repaired to prepare for transfer, and then put into the others body, A and B would not have to have a total recall of memory. The memory would be there to begin with when A and B woke up from the state they were put in for the information extraction.
We can now clearly describe a situation where persons A and B enter a machine and exit as the A-body person and B-body person. The A-body person has the appearance of A (i.e. the body of A), but has the memories of B, and the B-body person has the body of B and the memories of A. The question to ask concerning personal identity is - what happened to person A? Where does the identity of A now reside? Person A is now either in the body of A, in the body of B, in both bodies or has ceased to exist.
The possibility of person A being in both the body of A and B can be immediately ruled out on the assumption that there cannot be two of the same person. In other words, this possibility would violate transitivity. The Lockean theory of identity would insist that person A is in the B-body person, because that is where A’s consciousness is. A’s memories will now extend inside the body of B. If A and B are told that after the procedure one of them will get money and the other will receive torture, the logical answer A should give is for the B-body person to get the money and the A-body person to get the torture. Thus showing that this procedure must really be about changing bodies, because each subject considers himself to be in a new body. To care about what happens to ones self does not entail (by this situation) that one cares about ones present body.
III. The Six Cases
Williams then changes direction in his discussion of personal identity to argue for the bodily criterion. He proposes six different situations all including the end result of torturing A. Furthermore, in each case, A is told what will happen to him leading up to torture. Williams claims that no psychological state (other than unconsciousness) can change A’s fear of the upcoming torture; however, an opponent would argue that yes some psychological state can. Because to say it cannot leave in question the very person for whom A is fearful. In other words, it presupposes A will be A after the operation. Here are the six cases (all followed by torture):
(i) Amnesia is produced in A
(ii) (i), character is changed
(iii) (ii), fictitious illusory memories beliefs are induced
(iv) (iii), illusory memories believes are induced, namely those of person B
(v) (iv), except from a real person B
(vi) (v), A’s memories are transferred to B
Williams then discusses the possible differences in reaction towards each individual case and concludes that there can be no difference in fearing future torture. No one would claim that (i), (ii) and (iii) would produce any difference in A’s prospect of future pain. Just because one has forgotten (amnesia) that he will be tortured does not change the fact that he will be tortured. In fact, for one to be tortured without any prior knowledge could make ones fear worse. Logically, (ii) and (iii) make no relevant difference in principle; these situations only seem to give more reason to fear as well. Situation (iv) introduces B, but makes no material difference concerning A. It is an external fact (external to A) that such transferred memory impressions have a model (B). If (iv) does not produces a difference in attitude towards fear, than (v) will not either, because all that is added in (v) is a model for the cause. An outside model should have no bearing on experience or not experiencing future pain. The pain itself will still occur, so the expectation of pain is still present. “If his fears can, as it were, reach through the change, it seems a mere trimming how the change is in fact induced.” Situation (v) is different from the initial situation because there is a concrete person B left; therefore, there is no question as to which one is person A.
Most people would agree that there is a difference in case (vi). The difference being A now has reason to feel differently regarding any future pain, because according to the Lockean theory of identity, person A is now in the body of B. The impressions and character that once was in A is now in B, so this situation looks like that of a bodily-exchange. However, in situation (vi) there actually is no difference in what happens to person A. The only difference is that person B now has the memories and impressions of person A. If amnesia, new impressions and a model for new impressions do not effect person A’s attitude towards pain, then the fact that another person now has person A’s old impressions should not effect A’s attitude either. Personhood is local and is not be affected by what happens to another.
IV. Fear and Indeterminacy
It is not the case that fear can never be hindered from a psychological state. If someone is afraid of spiders, and will be forced in the future to go into jungle that houses many different varieties of spiders, one could be given a pill that curbs his or her psychological state to the point that he or she does not even believe spiders exist. This would allow such a person to enter in the jungle. Furthermore, one might fear change, even though such change would make the resulting state pleasant (e.g. if one could be hooked up to an eternal pleasure machine, but fear this option as better than his prior existence).
Lock claims that the pain will extend through case (vi), because aversion to pain is “absolutely minimally dependent on character or belief.” Aversion to pain is much different from less psychologically straining pain (e.g. what one feels when one hits his funny bone), because all people have the ability to experience it. Certain people may actually enjoy pain (e.g. masochist), but no one, unless psychologically incapable (e.g. unconscious) can enjoy extreme pain. Extreme pains are precisely what is being discussed here. No matter how masochistic, torture is not to be enjoyed by anyone.
One obvious question to ask is - why does Williams set up this thought experiment without any indeterminacy regarding if A will get tortured or not? In a sense, it might be fairer to opponents of Williams’s theory to set up the case with five subjects. Giving A less than one hundred percent probability of being tortured. However, Williams believes that this can not be the case. To be told that the chance that I will be tortured is less than sure should not effect me, because a borderline case has no comprehensible representation in my expectations of torture and of my feelings that go with my expectations (Williams). In other words, the fact that something may or may not happen to me in the future has no effect on me if said thing actually happens. If I win the lottery, my reaction will always be that of joy no matter what happened to me between buying the ticket and when the numbers were called.
I may be more cheerful if I know I have a chance of escaping the torture, but I will still have fear. All the emotions I have revolve around and have the capability of being changed by the eventual determination of the indeterminacy. There are many indeterminate factors that surround many particular situation. In all of Williams’s cases, what is determinate is that the subject will feel fear.
V. Conclusions
One of the general aspects in certain analytic theories of personal identity is that the type of language one uses when writing out thought experiments concerning personal identity can slant the conclusion of the argument containing such experiments. It is sometimes assumed that a first-person description supports a mentalistic (Lockean) view of the self, and a third-person description a bodily conception. However, the reverse happens in Williams’s article. The initial case is in the third person and supports the Lockean view and the second set of cases is in the first person and supports the bodily criterion.
However, Williams concludes that the reason why the initial case supports the Lockean view is how the example is set up. If A got B’s memories, but B kept his memories we would be more hesitant to accept the Lockean view. We would say A is in the A-body person with new memories.
VI. One Objection
I thought up one objection towards William’s theory. It seems that Williams allows for other emotions to be effected by a change in psychological states. If A is afraid of spiders, he can be given the impression of one who has no fear towards spiders. In a situation where that person would be soon forced to enter into a spider infested area, the new memories and character he has should help curb his present distress. He also allows that aversion to pain has minimal cause from character. So it seems that it is at least plausible for a culture that produces people who feel pain only slightly, and are more indifferent to pain than effected by it. Years of evolution could produce humans who hardly can feel pain if certain mutations develop that help in survival that cause such a thing. It is even possible if just one person develops this indifference. If A trusts everything we tell him before the torture, and we tell him that we found the one person on earth who is indifferent to pain and his impressions would be put into A’s brain, his attitude should change. If either of these scenarios occur it is possible for the new character, memories and impressions to help change the fear of future pain for someone who would do whatever is in their power not to feel it. Therefore, pain would not extend through the body changing experience.
I think this argument is not forceful though, because such impressions may be so different that such impressions have no connection with the new body they inhabit. Also, the body must be an important part of a human that is indifferent to pain. And, if the impressions are to actually make a difference, the new psychology can be the only possible factor to change the way the pain is felt. Without the old body, extreme forms of pain should penetrate even the most indifferent impressions. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that even impressions from such a differently evolved human would help.
Saturday, December 02, 2006
Blasphemy
Chico State's award winning ethics department taught our national and regional teams a certain way of competing at the national and regional level. This way involves focus on the question asked, the ethical principles involved, and relevant arguments for or against our conclusion. Today, at the regional competition, one of Chico States teams was upset by USC. Both Dr. Marcel Daquerre (regional coach) and I (competed in last years national event) were aghast by the decision. The opposing team made no mention of ethical principles at all in each time they had to speak. One exceptions though, was the use of duties; however they clearly misapplied the concept- making only sense of it from a non-moral standpoint.
USC suggested that it is a companies or corporations (or any business for that matter) duty to the safety of its employees. I cannot make sense of this claim. USC made the argument that companies have the right to make policy concerning any rules the company has (e.g. a company has the right to deny its employees the right to have guns in the cars on the companies owned private parking lot). This is because an employee has the authority to terminate his job at any time if he or she doesn't agree with said policy.
Therefore, how can it follow that a company has the duty to the safety of that companies employees? If said employer has the right to set policy however he or she chooses, said employer has no duty to uphold the safest working conditions. Furthermore, if hypothetically there was a duty (morally) for companies to uphold the safety of its employees we would think many companies to be immoral when common sense would disagree. Like high-rise construction workers, or high-risk fishing. Such workers work in highly unsafe conditions, and if there is such a duty, such employers could not even run un-safe jobs. But, there are unsafe jobs employed by companies that have the ability to promote the best possible conditions therein. This would include a company that wants to ban guns from its parking lot. It is in the interest of the company to promote the safest possible conditions and it is in the ability of the company to carry out this policy; therefore, the company ought to have this policy.
However, the fact that the company ought to have this policy has nothing to do with duty. The best way to justify why the company should promote safety is a public utility argument. Studies show that companies that implement this policy have workplaces averaging 71% fewer homicides. The company has the interest of the employees in mind when they made this policy. (Note, you could also make a Rights argument for having the policy).
Realize that a law maybe a good law, but it needs to be justified morally if it is to be used as the justification of ones claim in a moral debate.. Morality superceeds law since morality can be used to justify law but not vice'aversa.
Anyway, my team crushed them with all the moral arguments, but lost. I still can't believe it, everything else they said relied on some law. My coach is thinking about quiting, and now I can't compete at nationals.
USC suggested that it is a companies or corporations (or any business for that matter) duty to the safety of its employees. I cannot make sense of this claim. USC made the argument that companies have the right to make policy concerning any rules the company has (e.g. a company has the right to deny its employees the right to have guns in the cars on the companies owned private parking lot). This is because an employee has the authority to terminate his job at any time if he or she doesn't agree with said policy.
Therefore, how can it follow that a company has the duty to the safety of that companies employees? If said employer has the right to set policy however he or she chooses, said employer has no duty to uphold the safest working conditions. Furthermore, if hypothetically there was a duty (morally) for companies to uphold the safety of its employees we would think many companies to be immoral when common sense would disagree. Like high-rise construction workers, or high-risk fishing. Such workers work in highly unsafe conditions, and if there is such a duty, such employers could not even run un-safe jobs. But, there are unsafe jobs employed by companies that have the ability to promote the best possible conditions therein. This would include a company that wants to ban guns from its parking lot. It is in the interest of the company to promote the safest possible conditions and it is in the ability of the company to carry out this policy; therefore, the company ought to have this policy.
However, the fact that the company ought to have this policy has nothing to do with duty. The best way to justify why the company should promote safety is a public utility argument. Studies show that companies that implement this policy have workplaces averaging 71% fewer homicides. The company has the interest of the employees in mind when they made this policy. (Note, you could also make a Rights argument for having the policy).
Realize that a law maybe a good law, but it needs to be justified morally if it is to be used as the justification of ones claim in a moral debate.. Morality superceeds law since morality can be used to justify law but not vice'aversa.
Anyway, my team crushed them with all the moral arguments, but lost. I still can't believe it, everything else they said relied on some law. My coach is thinking about quiting, and now I can't compete at nationals.
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